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The Geostationary Orbit: Legal, Technical and
Political Issues Surrounding Its Use in World
Telecommunications
by The Georgetown Space Law Group*
F or the latter decades of the twentieth century the key phrase in in-
ternational economics has become "information is power." Transmit-
ting, receiving and collecting information has developed many passage-
ways to power, and all nations of the world are to some extent concerned
with the control of these passageways. Due to its special adaptation for
communications satellites, the Geostationary Orbit (GSO) has become
one of the most hotly disputed passageways.'
In 1946, Arthur C. Clarke first proposed that, by placing three satel-
lites in GSO, the earth could be blanketed with a communications net-
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work.2 It was not long afterward, in 1963, that the first communications
satellite was placed in the GSO.s Now, use of the GSO is in great demand
due to the advantages of geostationary satellites over other communica-
tion systems.
One advantage a geostationary satellite has over other orbiting com-
munications devices is that a groundstation need not have a complex
mechanism for receiving or transmitting signals. To receive or send trans-
missions the antenna is permanently aimed at the position in the sky oc-
cupied by the satellite. Thus, a groundstation can be a simple, no-frills
antenna, unencumbered by a sophisticated computer-driven tracking sys-
tem. Consequently, Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS) capable of reaching
substantial portions of the globe are economically feasible.4 The GSO is,
in fact, the only orbit in which DBS can operate.
Other uses for geostationary satellites include: remote sensing of the
earth's surface, either for military purposes or for natural resources man-
agement; navigational guidance, since targeting on just one geostationary
satellite permits earth bound calculations of a position; solar energy plat-
forms;5 and manned spaced stations, including spacecraft terminals.6
For these reasons, the GSO is a unique and controversial natural re-
source. Technologically, it serves as a platform from which a single com-
munications satellite can reach nearly one-half of the earth's surface. Le-
gally, it is a driving force for the development of new regimes in both
domestic and international law governing the use of new information
technology. Politically, it is the focal point of conflict between the devel-
oped nations, which are the established communications powers, and the
developing countries, which view the continued appropriation of this val-
uable and limited natural resource as a threat to their future
development.
This article will provide an examination of these three topic areas,
then describe the principal fora in which decisions concerning the GSO
have taken place, including the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), the 1982 UNISPACE Conference, and the SPACE-WARC.7 The
2 Clarke, Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Cov-
erage?, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at 305-08.
3 This satellite was the Syncom 3. See THE WORLD IN SPACE, A SURVEY OF SPACE ACTIV-
ITIES AND IssuEs 472 (R. Chipman ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as THE WORLD IN SPACE].
4 D. SMITH, SPACE STATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 6 (1979).
' Berger, International Law and Solar Energy and Solar Energy Satellites, Paoc. OF
THE TWENTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 149 (1978).
6 CaVault, Unit Sets Goal of Manned Lunar Base, 17 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.
21 (Nov. 29, 1982).
SPACE-WARC, officially called the ITU World Administrative Radio Conference on
the Use of the GSO and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It, will convene its first
sesson in 1985 and its second session in 1988. The purpose of the session will be to provide
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debate concerning the free flow of information versus national sovereignty
will be reviewed, along with an examination of various regulatory meth-
ods of transborder data flow, possible mechanisms for the resolution of
disputes occurring in space, and suggestions for preliminary governing re-
gimes during the initial testing of these mechanisms. Finally, several pro-
posals will be offered, among them the concept that, for political reasons,
the GSO must be viewed as a limited global resource of which developing
countries must be allocated an equitable share. Furthermore, for this allo-
cation to be workable in the international arena, regimes governing trans-
border communications will have to take account of cultural and sover-
eignty concerns of nations which lack the Western World's heritage of
freedom of expression.
1. GEOSTATIONARY ORBITS AND SATELLITES: BACKGROUND
Currently, two legal definitions of the term Geostationary Orbit are
recognized, the first found in the International Telecomunications Union
(ITU) Radio Regulations,s and the second in the Bogota Declaration.9
The key difference is that the Bogota Declaration attempts to place em-
phasis on a particular region in space as constituting "the" GSO, whereas
"equitable access to the GSO and to the frequency bands allocated to the space services
utilizing it." SPACE-WARC, Rep. No. 895, reprinted in In re An Inquiry Relating to Prepa-
ration for an International Telecommunications Union World Administrative Radio Confer-
ence on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of the Space Services
Utilizing It, Third Notice of Inquiry, General Docket No. 80-741 (Oct. 6, 1983) [hereinafter
Notice of Inquiry]. See also FCC, First Report of the Advisory Committee for the ITU's
World Administrative Conference on the use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the
Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It.
8 According to the ITU Radio Regulations, the following definitions apply. A geosyn-
chronous satellite is "an earth satellite whose period of revolution is equal to the period of
rotation of the Earth about its axis." A geostationary satellite is "a satellite, the circular
orbit of which lies in the plane of the Earth's equator and which turns about the polar axis
of the Earth in the same direction and with the same period as those of the Earth's rota-
tion." ITU Radio Regulations, Revision, Nov. 8, 1963, 846(b), 15 U.S.T. 920, T.I.A.S. No.
5603. The orbit on which a satellite should be placed to be a geostationary satellite is called
the "geostationary satellite orbit."
The Bogota Declaration defined the geostationary orbit in a slightly different way.
The geostationary orbit is:
[A] circular orbit on the equatorial plane in which the period of sidereal revolu-
tion of the satellite is equal to the period of sidereal rotation of the earth and the
satellite moves in the same direction of the earth's rotation. When a satellite de-
scribes the particular orbit it is said to be geostationary; such a satellite appears to
be fixed on the zenith of a given point of the equator, whose longitude is by defini-
tion that of the satellite. The orbit is located at an approximate distance of 35,781
km over the earth's equator.
Bogota Declaration, Nov. 29-Dec. 3, 1976, ITU Satellite Broadcasting Conference, Geneva
1977, Doc. 81, Annex 4, at 16.
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the ITU Regulations implicitly recognize that an orbit is the path a satel-
lite transcribes as it revolves through space about another body and that
an orbit is independent of particular regions the satellite passes
through.1 °
Scientifically, the term "geostationary" is inaccurate. Various physi-
cal forces that affect a satellite or any other object in such an orbit will
eventually cause that satellite to drift away from its intended geostation-
ary position. These forces include the periodic tug of the moon as it cir-
cumscribes the earth; solar wind, which varies with the activity of the
sun's surface; the density of the earth's residual atmosphere at the alti-
tude of the satellite's orbit, also dependent upon the sun;'1 collisions with
micrometeors; and, irregularities in the earth's gravitational field. 2 Con-
tinued corrections of the satellite's position are required if it is to remain
geostationary. In practice, this means that any satellite meant to remain
in a GSO for an extended period of time must possess a self-contained
propulsion system to supply corrective thrusts as needed. When the fuel
for this system is exhausted, the satellite will drift from its intended
orbit.
Thus, no region exists in space which can properly be labeled "the"
GSO. Rather, from a scientific standpoint, it is more accurate to say that
certain ideal parameters exist which would enable an imaginary satellite
to appear geostationary. Real satellites whose orbital parameters closely
match the ideal ones for a sufficient period of time can be said to travel in
a GSO.
Various natural and technological barriers exist which limit the ca-
pacity of the GSO as a communications network. Natural phenomena can
disrupt communications between a geostationary satellite and a fixed
earth receiving station. Drifting, the angular passage of a satellite across
the disc of the sun, results in "solar outage," during which time communi-
cations are interrupted by solar interference. If an interruption of com-
munications is not acceptable to the user, a second satellite has to be
10 The description given by the ITU appears somewhat closer to scientific fact.
I The early entry of the United States' Skylab in 1979, accompanied by its decay over
the South Pacific (with sizable chunks falling over the Australian continent), is a dramatic
example of the effect of this phenomenon. An increase in the activity of sunspots resulted in
an increase in the solar wind encountered by the earth. This caused a heating of the upper
atmosphere, and a corresponding increase in the atmospheric density in the orbital region
occupied by Skylab. There was consequently greater orbital friction than NASA had ex-
pected, and a much shorter orbital life for Skylab than calculated.
Although the principle is the same, the magnitude of the effect of this atmospheric
friction would be considerably less for satellites in geostationary orbits. This is because
these orbits are approximately 22,300 miles above the earth, whereas Skylab was only 400
miles. Nonetheless the effect would be felt.
12 Perek, Physics, Uses and Regulations of the Geostationary Orbit, or Ex Facto Se-
quitor Lex, PROC. OF THE TWENTIETH COLLIQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 403 (1978).
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placed in orbit for use during the periods of outage.' 3
A second type of natural disruption is the result of interference with
a satellite's power supply. Because most satellites use solar radiation for
their energy source, any interruption of the sun's rays will affect a satel-
lite's power supply during the interruption, thereby also disrupting com-
munication transmissions. 14 Objects capable of coming between a satellite
and the sun's disc are the earth, the moon and other satellites.
Collisions between satellites in the GSO are one type of technological
problem. As the size and number of devices placed in the GS0 increase
and the amount of "space debris" continues to grow, the possibility of
collision will also increase. Debris crossing a densely populated GSO may
emerge as an unacceptable risk for expensive and highly critical satellites.
The crowding problem will become especially critical in those portions of
the GSO most advantageous to the positioning of communications
satellites.1
5
Another type of technological barrier is the broadcast interference
which may occur between transmitting satellites. This type of interfer-
ence is a function of two factors: the physical distance between satellites
and the similarity of their transmitting frequencies.' 6
Given these natural and technological limitations, the scramble for
space in the GSO is and will be furious. Moreover, as new uses of and
customers for the GSO appear, these limitations may become more pro-
nounced, thereby providing fuel for potentially heated debates between
user states. Therefore, the potential uses of the GSO are important fac-
tors in determining international regimes with which to regulate GSO us-
age under these technological and natural limitations.
II. USES OF THE GSO
A. Economics and the LDC's
The emergence of the GS0 as an international legal issue can best be
understood against the background of increasing pressure from the lesser
developed countries (LDC's) for what they perceive to be a more equita-
ble share of the world's economic resources. This pressure emerged as a
coherent and concerted campaign by the "Group of 77" (G77) 1 in the
13 Id. at 405.
14 Id. at 405-06.
15 Id. at 404.
16 Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite
Service, 94 F.C.C.2d 129, 130 n.6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Assignment of Orbital
Locations].
'7 The Group of 77 was the title adopted by the loose-knit coalition of all developing
countries. Originally 77 in number, the Group has now expanded to include almost 120 de-
veloping nations.
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early 1970's. The G77's position embraced wide-ranging claims on issues
as diverse as national sovereignty (e.g., the 200-mile maritime economic
zones for coastal states), restructuring the international financial institu-
tions established at Bretton Woods (including massive debt reschedul-
ing), intellectual property (e.g., technology transfers to assist LDC indus-
trialization) and recognition that the two great final frontiers, outer space
and the high seas, were the "common heritage of mankind."' 8 All these
issues were subsumed in, and identified as, the search for a "New Inter-
national Economic Order" (NIEO).
One consistent theme running through all NIEO debates was the ex-
ploitation of LDC's, initially by the great colonial powers and, more re-
cently, by the industrialized West. Closely allied to this was the "reasser-
tion" by all LDC's of the right to control their "natural resources,"
including the claim by a group of LDC's to ownership of the GSO.'9 Be-
cause this claim emerged from a decade in which the majority of the in-
ternational community had agreed that "[o]uter space ... shall be free
for exploration and use of all states,"2 0 it was viewed as a mere aberration
contrary to international law by non-LDC's. 2" However, rather than being
a mere aberration, this claim was symptomatic of a frustration which has
great significance for the orderly evolution of international law. The rea-
son for this backlash by the LDC's is simple: the LDC's perceive satellite
technology as a valuable resource to assist development in the poorest
countries. This assistance would come in the form of accelerated resource
discovery, development and management (via remote sensing satellites).
Furthermore, satellite technology would expand communications and
educational programs via DBS, which would allow cost minimalization of
information dissemination particularly in large countries such as India
and Indonesia which have widely dispersed rural populations. Tropical
LDC's also envision major long-term benefits from meteorological satel-
lites for monsoon prediction and food stock management.
Stated specifically, the Bogota Declaration represented a political
backlash against the industrialized nations' alleged usurpation of the
GSO. Today, because these conflicting views threaten the efficiency of in-
ternational communications networks, the concern of the LDC's that they
not be preempted from participation in the use of the GSO because of
their technological infancy is an issue that industrialized nations should
quickly address. The stakes involved are high. For the LDC's, their future
'8 International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 33, 28 U.S.T. 2497,
T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter cited as I.T.C.].
" The Bogota Declaration, supra note 9.
20 Outer Space Treaty, Oct. 10, 1967, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
21 Leister, Third World Space Activities, PROC. OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 237 (1982).
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development-even survival-is dependent on their sharing the benefits
of the advanced technologies of the West. For the industrialized nations,
a conflict with the LDC's over use of the GSO may produce ripple effects
in other areas of "North-South" relations. There are few areas in which
the costs of compromise will pay greater dividends than in the area of
communications satellites and the efficient and cooperative utilization of
the GSO.
B. The Strategic Factor: Military and Intelligence Satellites
The GSO is important not only as an aid to economic growth but also
for strategic and intelligence purposes. The military use of the GSO can-
not be overlooked when assessing the spacial and spectral demands
placed on this resource. Unfortunately, because some satellites occupying
the GSO are transmitting highly sensitive military and national security
data, information concerning such satellites and their communication
flow is highly restricted. Therefore, estimates as to the spacial and spec-
tral demands these satellites place on the GSO is guesswork at best.
The military satellites currently in the GSO include early warning
satellites (designed to spot the rocket plumes of ICBMs within one min-
ute of liftoff)22 and possibly anti-satellite satellites (ASATs).23 The intelli-
gence satellites currently placed in the GSO include photo reconnais-
sance, electronic intelligence and general surveillance models.24 They
include the most sophisticated and important monitoring and surveil-
lance in the developed countries' "intelligence arsenals. '2 5
Not only does the classified nature and extent of these satellites
make it impossible to accurately estimate their burden on the GSO, but it
is also impossible to discern distinctions between commercial and military
satellites. The fact is that: "[T]ons of electronic surveillance equipment at
this moment are inter-connected within our domestic and international
common carrier telecommunications systems. Much more is under con-
tract for installation. ' 2 Thus, satellites operated by COMSAT,27 and its
22 J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY 191
(1982).
2S The Soviet Union already has ASAT capability, and the U.S. Defense Department's
largest exploratory development progaram is aimed at developing laser weapons. Tyler,
Study Raps Laser Arms Funding Lag, Washington Post, Mar. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 6; Boffey,
Pressures are Increasing for Arms Race in Space, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, at B9, col. 1.
The proposed ASAT's will be "parked" in geosynchronous orbits. See Borad, A Fatal Flaw
in the Concept of Space Law, 215 SCIENCE 1372 (Mar. 12, 1982).
24 J. CANAN, WAR IN SPACE 102 (1982).
:5 For a description of the importance of these satellites, see id. at 101-13.
26 J. BAMFORD, supra note 22, at 376.
27 Communication Satellite Corporation.
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international counterpart, INTELSAT," form a significant, if "passive,"
intelligence gathering apparatus.29
Military and intelligence satellites in GSO present two factors of ma-
jor significance. First, these satellites must be accounted for when analyz-
ing physical congestion. There is no reason to suppose that their numbers
will diminish. Second, and more importantly, the space powers (and to a
lesser extent their allies) have a major security interest to protect in any
negotiations concerning the future use of the GSO.
III. SCIENTIFIC ANSWERS TO GSO ALLOCATION
The uses and potential of the GSO are great; however, it is limited in
size, to approximately 163,000 miles in length. Thus, with 300 devices
placed in orbit, the spacing between them will be roughly 500 miles. More
importantly for communications purposes, the angular separation is little
more than 10 of arc. As the number of geostationary satellites increase,
the separation will decrease, and congestion will result in radio interfer-
ence between communications satellites. The interference is more acute
because certain areas (bands) of the GSO are more useful than
others-those being the bands over heavily populated regions of the
earth. Thus, the actual angular separation for the majority of satellites
will be less than a simple average.
Despite concerns of LDC's that, due to the GSO's inefficient use or
domination by today's space powers, developing countries may never have
the opportunity to share its benefits,30 other commentators have sug-
gested that continuing advances in technology will rapidly dissipate any
such limitations of the GSO or perhaps even make its use obsolete.3 1 One
technological innovation, ground-based fiber optics, has been suggested as
a complete substitute for communications satellites. Optical fibers are ex-
tremely thin strands of glass or plastic3 2 with qualities which allow the
transmission of light over long distances.33 In practice, thousands of these
strands are bundled together in a cable. As a transmission medium, opti-
cal fibers are superior to satellite radio communications, and the cost of
the fibers themselves are so small that the major costs involved are those
28 INTELSAT stands for International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.
29 J. BAMFORD, supra note 22, at 333.
30 Ferrer, The Use of the Geostationary Orbit, PROC. OF THE TWENTIETH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 216 (1978).
31 THE WORLD IN SPACE, supra note 3, at 472, 479.
32 Some types of optical fibers are on the order of several microns in diameter. Bell
Lab's Advances in Fiber Optics Discussed at OFC '82, 5 FIBER OPTIcs & COM. 2 (1982).
S A. Rutkowski, The Impact of New Technology on Satellite Radiocommunications
(Nov. 10, 1982) (unpublished paper prepared for the FCC 1983 Space World Administrative
Radio Conference Advisory Committee).
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of right-of-way and laying the cable.34 Such cables can readily serve as
trunk lines between major communications centers.
Fiber optic cables do, however, suffer from limitations which satel-
lites do not. Transoceanic trunk lines will remain expensive and provide
service only between two terminus points. In contrast, one satellite can
provide spread coverage over one-third of the earth's surface. A need for
this type of broad coverage exists, for example, in those developing coun-
tries with rugged or discontiguous terrain or with widely distributed
populations.3 5 Moreover, this type of service could be more affordable
than optic systems, since countries could share a satellite or perhaps lease
portions of a satellite's broadcast time, spectrum or signal direction. Fi-
nally, optic cable suffers from the further limitation that, by its nature, it
has a physical presence in the territories it traverses, thus inviting tariffs,
regulations and other forms of government control. In the final outlook,
rather than fiber optics replacing geostationary satellites, they will act in-
stead to merely alleviate GSO crowding as a cost efficient method of con-
necting two points between which communication is regular and heavy.
Refinements of broadcast technology also promise to improve the ef-
ficiency of satellite telecommunications. Satellites which operate on dif-
ferent frequencies can be clustered, since only similar frequencies inter-
fere with each other. Systematic allocation of alternate positions in the
GSO will increase the space between satellites with similar frequencies,
and so may also reduce interference.3 6 Cross polarization of the signals of
nearby satellites can be utilized, although this would require more sophis-
ticated groundstations3 7 Suppression of sidelobes through improved an-
tennae is also possible."' Major advances in the modulation of radio sig-
nals, or the manipulation of the signal to maximize spectral efficiency, are
presently being achieved,3" and they are approaching a theoretical limit of
six-fold increase in information transmitted per unit bandwidth.40
Laser technology by satellite is one alternative to radio broadcasts
which would effectively eliminate interference, thus reducing the spacing
limitations of satellites. However, laser signals are extremely susceptible
34 Id.
31 The benefits which would accrue to developing countries would best be illustrated
from the example of the ATS-6 satellite, which would broadcast to the Indian sub-continent
on frequency of 860 MHz with 3-meter parabolic antennae to about 5000 villages. See
Andhyarujana, Direct Satellite Telecommunications and Space Law, PROC. OF THE TWENTI-
ETH COLLOQUIM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 143 (1978).
'3 Perek, supra note 12, at 405.
3: Id.
8 Id.
" Rutkowski, supra note 33.
40 Hill & Feher, NLA 64-State QAM: A Power and Spectral Efficient Modulation
Technique for Digital Radio, 182 IEEE ICC 3B.2.1. (1982).
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to adverse weather conditions. Furthermore, the reception and transmis-
sion of laser signals will require considerably more complex ground sta-
tions than radio signals require, defeating a major advantage of communi-
cations satellites.
Thus, despite these technological alternatives, demand and need will
remain for GSO radio broadcasting in global communications systems,
mainly because of its two advantages of flexibility and simplicity. Unfor-
tunately, estimates place the number of active broadcast devices in the
GSO by 1990 at 239."1 If evenly spaced, this would mean a radial separa-
tion of about 1.50 of arc.4 2 In the years beyond 1990, it can be expected
that, because of spacing problems alone, some international allocation
system will be necessary to preserve order in the global exploitation of
the GSO.
IV. ALLOCATION AND REGULATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Conceptual Framework
Customary international law acknowledges a state's sovereignty over
airspace above its territory.48 Arguably, this sovereignty would include
the absolute right of a state to preclude transmission of radio, television
or data flow information into their territory from abroad. However, an-
other notion in international law is that individuals possess rights which
are separate from those of states, and among those rights is that of the
free flow of information. Many nations have argued that, like freedom
from slavery and piracy, this right of information is of jus cogens charac-
ter. Under the standards of the United Nations Treaty and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, nations have thus called for the elimina-
11 Gehrig, Geostationary Orbit-Technology and Law, Psoc. ON THE NINETEENTH COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 267, 270 (1977).
"I This spacing will be uneven, however, as most of these satellites will be stationed
above particular areas of the globe where the need for radio communication is greatest.
Thus, the actual angular separation will be considerably less than 1.50.
43 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). The principle of
sovereignty over air space is included in the Chicago Convention on International Civil Avi-
ation of 1955, which states:
Article 1
The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Article 2
For the purpose of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to
be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty,
suzerainty, protection or mandate of such state.




tion of restrictions against the flow of information across borders. 44
The focus of current international law in the area of satellite-to-earth
communications attempts to strike a proper balance between sovereignty
and the free flow of information. A rough classification finds nations al-
igned in one of three positions in this regard. Most of the Western indus-
trialized democracies, for economic as well as political reasons, believe
that "the best guarantee for freedom of expression and information is ab-
sence of interference by public authorities with the content of informa-
tion ... and with the free flow of information across borders.
45
The communist countries by and large consider that the legitimacy of
information depends on the purpose for which it is used. "Transborder
information flows are permissible as long as they serve the cause of peace
and do not violate the sovereignty of receiving nations. '46
The developing nations occupy the third position within this dispute.
They generally perceive themselves as being disadvantaged with respect
to information and the utilization of new technologies, as they have his-
torically been with other resources. They support open communications
where this reflects an equitable distribution of resources. 47 Simultane-
ously, however, these nations are interested in controlling information
and its concomitant technology for what they feel are vital cultural and
security restrictions. These nations feel, to varying degrees, an urgent
need for access to information, but also seek control over the broadcast
content and over those who receive it.
B. The Current Patchwork of Regulation
Within this context there currently exists a multitude of regulatory
regimes applicable to satellite-to-ground communications. Conceptually,
"4The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
4 See Europeans Tackle DBS Issues, 5 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 234 (1982). Nonethe-
less, the United States, Great Britain and other free-flow oriented nations have not com-
pletely adopted the free-flow doctrine, but father have implemented controls in the general
area of information transfers.
Two provisions in the U.S. law give the government effective control over private inter-
national shortwave broadcasting. By statute, the FCC is empowered to assess the "adequacy
of such efforts." The Smith-Mundt Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976). By regulation, the FCC will
only license private international shortwave broadcasters if the service will "promote inter-
national goodwill, understanding, and cooperation." 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1982). Also, any
treaty obligation with respect to DBS activities would, even if it impinged on the first
amendment rights of broadcasters, fall within the national security exception that arguably
exists under the doctrine in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), though the treaty itself can-
not overrule Bill of Rights guarantees. See Price, The First Amendment in Television
Broadcasting by Satellite, 23 U.C.L.A. L.R. 879 (1976).
46 Europeans Tackle DBS Issues, supra note 45, at 254.
47 Id.
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they may be categorized as follows: national systems of various states;
international bodies, with their standards and codes of conduct relating
to technical matters and content; regional arrangements; and, interna-
tional fora for consultation and dispute resolution on an ad hoc basis
without international standards."
1. National Systems
The effect of programming regulations at the national level can be
seen in a comparison of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The United
States is the most free-flow oriented nation of all states concerned with
this issue. Yet, the United States' national system is based on the fact
that the electromagnetic spectrum is limited and thus must be "rationed"
(or regulated), despite the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution guar-
anteeing freedom of speech.'9 Analogously, in the area of satellite commu-
nications, the first amendment gives way as well. The United States re-
tains strict control over international broadcasting via the maintenance of
assigned frequencies and by requiring that international satellite commu-
nications take place through designated carriers.5
Pending any international agreement allocating slots, the United
States, and to a lesser extent Canada, Mexico and some Central American
countries, have already begun attempts to eliminate, or at least forestall,
interference producing congestion between GSO satellites using the 4/6
GHz and 12/14 GHz bands.5' The U.S. Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) realizes the potential problems it faces in regulating the GSO
when U.S. companies and other Western Hemisphere countries request
more slots in the GSO than are available.
The FCC has been delegated the arduous task of allocating U.S. do-
mestic satellites, 52 and, a fortiori, all GSO allocations in the Western
Hemisphere. In 1981, the FCC adopted an interim plan to allocate slots
on an essentially first-come, first-serve basis, while also beginning a
rulemaking proceeding to evaluate the feasibility of reducing orbital sepa-
ration and designing a more appropriate allocation method.5 3
The FCC's inquiry culminated in two Memorandum Opinion and
48 Price, supra note 45. Prof. Price also suggests that an international ban on any con-
straints whatsoever is an option for the international community. Inasmuch as the likely
result of instituting such a ban would be the very stultification of communications the ban
would seek to avoid, it is not discussed in any detail here. In the area of DBS, however,
Prices' thoughts on content regulation in international broadcasting are still relevant.
' Id. at 68-70.
:0 Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 731-44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1 Assignment of Orbital Locations, 94 F.C.C.2d at 133 n.14.
52 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1976).
"' Orbit Deployment Plan-Domestic Satellites, 84 F.C.C.2d 584 (1981).
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Orders. 5 Acknowledging that the FCC may not be able to accommodate
the desires of all entities wishing to position objects in the GSO,55 the
FCC settled on an approach designed merely to forestall congestion by
requiring all GSO satellites utilizing the 12/14 GHz bands to be posi-
tioned at 2° angular separation, and GSO satellites utilizing the 4/6 GHz
bands to be positioned within 2.50 as quickly as possible.5
The difficulty in immediately reducing the spacing of the "older" 4/6
GHz satellites is that there are 12 such satellites already situated in
space, requiring physical repositioning. Of greater importance, however, is
the burgeoning number of relatively uncomplex earth stations currently
receiving signals from such satellites. Not only would all of these earth
stations have to be reoriented, but many lack the complexity to eliminate
co-channel interference caused by a 20 spaced neighboring satellite. For
these reasons, the FCC took a lenient stand in implementing allocation
regulations: "We have consistently held that the desires of an applicant
for a particular orbital location do not limit our flexibility to assign orbi-
tal locations that best serve the public interest. '57 Instead, the FCC justi-
fled a slower reduction of spacing for the 4/6 GHz satellites because of
"long leadtimes, high costs, and risks allocated with domestic satellites."5 8
The FCC must be commended on its attempt to deal with difficult
technical problems, but its solution appears to be too little, too late. The
repositioning itself is extremely complex."9 But more importantly, the
FCC did little to head off future problems by adopting a comprehensive
allocation system which will ensure efficient and equitable allocation of
the few remaining Western Hemisphere slots.
The FCC admitted that some allocation method was necessary,60 but
it stopped short of adopting either a comparative hearing or a lottery-
type proceeding. Instead, the FCC will begin merely to stringently review
applications for allocations and demand that companies seeking slots pro-
vide more information.6 1 However, if this system does not work, the FCC
indicated that it may proceed to a comparative hearing proceeding rather
Assignment of Orbital Locations, 94 F.C.C.2d 129 (1983); In re Filing of Applications
for New Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed Satellite Service, 93 F.C.C.2d 1260 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Filing of Applications].
" Assignment of Orbital Locations, 94 F.C.C.2d at 130.
" Positioning 12/14 GHz satellites at 20 spacing will create few problems, since there
are only three such satellites currently in the GSO (although a number more have been
authorized and are nearly ready to launch). Id.
57 Id.
5 Id. at 131.
': See id. at 134-40 for an indication of just what the repositioning entails.
00 Filing of Applications, 93 F.C.C.2d at 1261.
61 Id. at 1261-67.
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than a lottery.6 2
In light of the very few remaining slots over the United States, and
the complexity of proposals filed with the FCC, it seems doubtful that
this process will weed out all but the most poorly filed or speculative ap-
plications. The process certainly will not result in so few qualified appli-
cants that the FCC can continue to allocate on a first-come, first-serve
basis.
In comparison, little is known concerning the Soviets' approach to
the physical allocation of the GSO. Regarding the content of GSO satel-
lite transmissions, the Soviet system expressly limits speech to that which
furthers socialist goals. The interaction of these two systems can be seen
in the Helsinki accords, specifically in the bilateral approach towards the
use of national systems for regulating information flow as found in "Bas-
ket III. ''63 These accords have proven to be ineffectual in assuring free
flow in the Soviet Union, thus demonstrating a problem inherent in using
national systems to regulate communications, i.e., the manifold interpre-
tations given by different states to the same concept.6 4
2. International Regulatory Bodies
The second regime, international standards and codes of conduct,
continues to evolve out of negotiations.6 " The reasons for regulating com-
munications from the geostationary orbit under such standards and codes
are primarily threefold. First, international norms tend to protect smaller,
less developed nations which lack the power to broadcast from space or to
prevent the reception of such broadcasts. Second, given the disparate
views reflected in national regulatory systems, international norms are a
necessary means for reducing the conflict which is inevitable in an unreg-
ulated system. Third, since the GSO is a species of res communes,6 6 the
62 Id. at 1263.
"' Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Accords),
Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). In contrast to the first amendment pre-
sumption against prior restraint of communications, article 125 of the Soviet Constitution
on freedom of speech, press and assembly is explicitly limited "in conformity with the inter-
ests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system." See H. BERMA,
JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SovIET LAW 378 (1963).
'4 See, e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention Into the Domestic Affairs
of States, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966),
reprinted in L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 920 (1980).
6 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
44, at 71.
6 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20. See generally Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in
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world community in toto, not merely the sending and receiving states,
should also determine the manner in which the GSO is employed.67
a. The Role of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The apportionment and use of the spectrum over which satellite
communications are carried is governed in part by the International Tele-
communications Convention (ITC) and annexed Radio Regulations .6 Sig-
nals broadcast from groundstations to satellites located in GSO, signals
relayed from one satellite to another (be they in GSO or not) and signals
sent down to earth all fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the ITU"
During the 1971 World Administrative Radio Conference, the ITU
adopted several resolutions and regulations which affected satellite com-
munications and the use of the GSO.70
i. Composition and Authority of the ITU
The ITU consists of: the Plenipotentiary and Administrative Confer-
ences; the Administrative Council; the International Frequency Registra-
tion Board (hereinafter the IFRB), a body of five independent members
which exists within the framework of the ITU; a general secretariat
headed by the ITU Secretary-General; and two technical advisory groups,
the International Consultative Committee on Radio (CCIR), and the In-
ternational Consultative Committee on Telegraph and Telephone
(CCITT).7 1
The ITU's "supreme organ" is the Plenipotentiary Conference.7 2
Composed of delegations representing all member countries, each with
one vote, it is responsible for revising the ITC and for establishing gen-
eral policies and programs. 3 It differs from many conference of special-
ized U.N. agencies in two principal aspects: it meets relatively infre-
the Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rule of International Space Law, 19
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1981).
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty reads, in pertinent part:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic development, and shall be the province of
all mankind.
:7 Price, supra note 45, at 75-76.
8 I.T.C, supra note 18. One-hundred fifty-seven states, including the United States, are
parties.
1, Id. at art. 33.
70 Id.
71 Id. at art. 5.
72 Id. at art. 5.1.
73 Id. at art. 6.2.
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quently (about once every five years), and it undertakes at each such
conference the laborious and time consuming task of revising the entire
convention. The Administrative Council, which consists of 36 members of
the Union elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference, directs the affairs
of the ITU between the conferences. 4
As opposed to the Plenipotentiary Conferences, the Administrative
Conferences are far less grandiose in scale. Formed pursuant to article 7
of the ITC, the Administrative Conferences consist of world administra-
tive conferences and the functionally more limited regional administra-
tive conferences. They may consider only items specifically included in
their agenda,7 5 and they are normally convened to consider specific issues
of telecommunications.7 6
The IFRB is charged with enforcing the ITC and its regulations.7 7
This enforcement machinery, however, is limited. The Board cannot or-
der stations off the air and cannot even refuse to record frequency assign-
ments (claims to frequencies made by agencies for/as representatives of
member governments) in the Master Register.7 8 This lack of enforcement
power does not mean that IFRB and ITC decisions are ignored; most ITU
members find it in their own best interest to follow the IFRB's deci-
sions.79 Since the ITC, its Regulations and IFRB findings are essentially
self-enforcing, publicizing the violations is essential. The Regulations pro-
vide for the regular publication of all IFRB actions.80
The regulations under which these ITU bodies work (the Convention
and the Radio Regulations currently in force were enacted in 197381) are
the product of over 100 years of development, and can only be under-
stood in the historical context of an increasingly congested radio spec-
trum. The ITC's genesis was the Telegraph Convention of 1865,2 and the
Radio Regulations trace their roots to the Berlin Final Protocol of 1903.83
The ITU's spectrum management scheme was developed at the 1947 At-
lantic City Conference in response to radio frequency congestion.8 4 The
Atlantic City Conference's objective was the ultimate establishment of an
7" Id. at art. 8.
1 Id. at art. 7.2.
76 Id. at art. 7.3(2).
7 Id. at art 10.1.a.
78 Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, art. 9, 12 U.S.T. 2498, T.I.A.S. No. 4893.
79 U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, RADIOFREQUENCY USE AND MANAGEMENT: IMPACTS FROM
THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE OF 1979 (1982).
80 Radio Regulations, supra note 78, at art. 10, § IV.
81 I.T.C., supra note 18, at art. 13.
'2 International Telegraph Convention, May 17, 1865, 130 Parry's T.S. 198.
" Final Protocol for the Preliminary Conference, Aug. 13, 1903, 194 Parry's T.S. 46; see
D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1970).
D. LEIVE, supra note 83, at 56.
Vol. 16:223
GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT
"engineered," or allocated, electromagnetic spectrum. 5 The IFRB was
created and granted a range of powers, including the legal and technical
examination of new notices and the issuance of findings. Protections for
existing stations from harmful interference by others was recognized as a
major right of an ITU member.86 However, this protection was only to be
accorded to those stations acting in conformity with the ITC and the Ra-
dio Regulations, thus providing the ITU with both the carrot and the
stick to regulate radio broadcasts.
The second noteworthy feature of the Atlantic City Conference was
the establishment of an elaborate procedure for the ratification and regis-
try of frequency assignments. Each state was required to conform with
the procedure if it wished to receive ITU protection against harmful in-
terference.87 Furthermore, when disputes over harmful interference arise
between ITU members, article 15 of the Regulations provides procedural
instructions for bilateral settlements by the parties to the dispute. A
85 Id.
s Id.; see also International Telecommunications Convention (Atlantic City Confer-
ence), Oct. 2, 1947, art. 44, 63 Stat. 1581, T.I.A.S. No. 1901.
87 Article 10(2) of the 1973 Convention states:
The essential duties of the International Frequency Regulation Board shall be: (a)
to effect an assigment made by the different countries so as to establish, in accor-
dance with the procedure provided for in the Radio Regulations . . . the date,
purpose and technical characteristics of each of these assignments, with a view to
ensuring formal international cognition thereof.
I.T.C., supra note 18, at art. 10(2).
The first step in the procedure leading toward the recording of new assignments in the
Master Register takes place when an administration (a nation's government or specialized
agency) formally notifies the IFRB that it has made a frequency assignment to a station
under its jurisdiction. An administration cannot insist that the IFRB accept an incomplete
notice. At this stage, therefore, the Regulations allow the Board to penalize an administra-
tion which refuses to furnish all the required information. This is almost the complete ex-
tent of the Board's enforcement powers.
Once the Board has received a complete notice, the particulars of the new assignment
(claim) and the date of receipt of the notice by the IFRB are published in the Weekly
Circular distributed to all administrations. Administrations thereafter have an opportunity
to present comments or objections, either directly to the other administrations, or to the
IFRB.
The IFRB examines such notices based on when they are received. The assigments are
examined for conformity with the Convention and Regulations, and concerning the
probability of harmful interference. The IFRB's findings must be based upon the
probability of harmful interference to notified assignments, regardless of actual use. Radio
Regulations, supra note 78; D. LEvz, supra note 83, at 99. Regulation 515 provides that an
assignment with an unfavorable finding with respect to harmful interference will be re-
corded in the Register only if the administration concerned verifies that the assigment has
been in use for at least 60 days without either the administration or the Board having re-
ceived any complaint of harmful interference. Regulation 516 provides a complex investiga-
tory procedure to determine the extent to which an unfavorable finding which was legally
correct corresponds to actual spectrum usage.
1984
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
party may request the IFRB to conduct a study of the dispute and issue
its finding and recommendations, but the Board will first determine
whether the request is premature because of the party's's failure to use
the article 15 bilateral settlement procedures.
ii. ITU Resolutions Concerning the Geostationary Orbit
The World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) has adopted a
number of resolutions affecting the ITU regulatory scheme. The 1971
WARC, WARC-ST, adopted Resolution SPA-i, which related to equal
use of the frequency bands by all countries for space radio communica-
tions services, provided that "the registration with the ITU of frequency
assignments for space radio communication services and their use should
not provide any permanent priority for any individual country or
groups."8 8 This resolution specified that all countries had equal rights in
the use of radio frequencies and of the GSO for radio services and that
the radio frequency spectrum and the GSO were "limited natural re-
sources."8 9 This resolution was, however, non-binding.
WARC did make other-binding-changes in the requirement of the
Radio Regulations:
[An administration] which intends to establish satellite systems shall,
prior to the coordination procedure, send to the International Frequency
Registration Board not earlier than five years before the date of bringing
into service each satellite network .. . the information listed ....
Before an administration notifies the Board or brings into use any fre-
quency assignment to a space station on a geostationary satellite .. .it
shall effect coordination of the assignment with other administrations
whose assignment in the same band ... is recorded in the Master
Register.9"
The 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference amended the I.T.C. to further
reflect the importance of space communications. Article 10(3)(b) was
added, giving the Board the duty to "effect, in the same conditions and
for the same purpose, an orderly recording of the positions assigned by
countries to geostationary satellites.""1 Article 10(3)(c) was changed to in-
clude, as an IFRB duty, the furnishing of advice to members "with a view
to the equitable, effective and economical use of the geostationary satel-
lite orbit. '9 2 Article 4(c) was also modified, making it a goal of the ITU to
"coordinate efforts with a view to harmonizing the development of tele-
11 World Administrative Radio Conference, July 17, 1971, Res. No. SPA 2-1, 23 U.S.T.
1820, T.I.A.S. No. 7435.
89 Id.
90 Id. at art. 9A.
91 I.T.C., supra note 18, at art. 10(3)(b).
92 Id. at art. 10(3)(c).
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communications facilities, notably those using the space techniques, with
a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities."M"
Although these changes are somewhat vague, their addition and a
new article 33 reflects the attempt by developing countries to engraft the
concept of the "common heritage of mankind"'" onto the ITU's operating
procedure. Article 33, entitled "Rational Use of the Radio Frequency
Spectrum and of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit," states:
1. Members shall endeavor to limit the number of frequencies and
the spectrum space used to a minimum .... To that end they shall
endeavor to apply the latest technical advances as soon as possible.
2. In using frequency bands for space radio services members shall
bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit
are limited natural resources, that they must be used efficiently and eco-
nomically so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable
access to both . . .according to their needs and the technical facilities at
their disposal.5
The importance of efficient use of the spectrum/orbit and the princi-
ple of equal rights of all countries found further expression in the Pream-
ble of the Final Acts of the 1977 WARC for Planning of the Broadcast-
ing-Satellite Service. The signatories acknowledged "the importance of
making the best possible use of the [spectrum/orbit] ... as well as the
need for an orderly development of the services,""" and took into account
"the equal rights of all countries, large and small. 97 The 1977 World Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference on Broadcast Satellites (WARC) adopted
a plan designating frequency assignments in certain spectrum bands and
positions in the GSO for Region 1 (Europe, Africa, the USSR, and
Mongolia) and Region 3 (Asia and the Pacific). Plans for a similar alloca-
tion scheme for Region 2 (the Americas) were at that time postponed, in
return for two compromises: (1) an agreement by Region 2 members to an
alternating area segmentation approach and (2) an agreement to hold a
Regional Administrative Radio Conference not later than 1982 for the
9s Id. at art. 4(c)(2).
94 Sarker, International Telecommunication Convention and its Impact on Institu-
tions, PRoc. OF THE SVENTFEENTH COLLOQIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 82 (1975).
" I.T.C., supra note 18, at art. 33. A change in article 33 which is important for discus-
sion of the GSO was adopted in 1982. Article 33 now provides that ITU must place special
emphasis on meeting the deloping countries' needs and their geographical location. Notice
of Inquiry, supra note 7, at 5. The implication is that such special treatment of the develop-
ing countries will be at the expense of the rest of the world.
98 Final Acts of the World Broadcasting Satellite Administrative Radio Conference,
1977, preamble. See also Butler, World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning
Broadcasting Satellite Service, 5 J. SPACE L. 93 (1977).
97 Id.
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purpose of adopting a detailed plan." When the Region 2 Regional Con-
ference was finally held in the summer of 1983, it likewise prepared a
priori assignments in the GSO over the western hemisphere." The 1979
WARC adopted Resolution No. 3 to "guarantee" all countries equitable
access to the GSO and to its frequency bands.100
Thus, the concept of an "engineered spectrum" as first propounded
in the Atlantic City Conference appears near fruition. The spectrum has
already been allocated and the GSO are beginning to be allocated. Con-
currently, the IFRB's jurisdiction has been expanded, and a greater em-
phasis has been placed on the world community's needs by requiring that
the Board evaluate how "efficient" a proposed project is in relation to the
scarcity of the resources.
Finally, the November 1982 meeting of the ITU in Nairobi confirmed
the outlook for an increasingly assertive stance by the developing coun-
tries at forthcoming meetings of the ITU and WARC. The poorer coun-
tries not only adopted an increased budget for the ITU against the strong
objections of the two superpowers, but they specified expenditures which
were to be substantially redirected to provide technical assistance for
LDC's. 10' According to the leader of the U.S. Delegation, the confronta-
tion between the space powers and the LDC's would have been even more
serious had it not been for an offer by the U.S. of private sector technical
training for Third World technocrats and bureaucrats. 0 2 It is becoming
clear that efforts of Western countries to keep "political" issues out of
international technical fora will no longer be successful, particularly
where LDC's believe they have basic interests at stake and see advantages
to be gained by the introduction of such issues.
b. The UNISPACE Consensus on Communications Satellites in GSO
The explosive scientific and conceptual developments in the decade
following the launch of Sputnik in 1957 prompted the United Nations to
9Id.
See Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and International Regulation,
37 VAND. L.J. 67, 103-04 (1984). The United States accepted the assignment plan despite
reservations with it.
100 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 7, at 5.
101 This may create conflict with the stated U.S. Congressional intent of barring in-
creased technical assistance from the budgets of specialized U.N. agencies.
102 The United Nations General Assembly adopted in November 1982 a resolution stat-
ing basic principles governing use by states of satellites for international direct television
broadcasting. The resolution states that DBS should be compatible with states' sovereign
rights as well as their rights to receive and send information. Principles Governing the Use
by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A.
Res. 92, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
1982 United Nations Resolution].
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call the first U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space in 1968.103 That first Conference forecasted the establish-
ment of routine operation of space communications systems. In the fol-
lowing fourteen years, cooperation between the ITU and the United Na-
tions Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS)
became imperative because of the great number of satellites annually
launched. I \
In 1982, the time once again came to assess developments, encourage
cooperation and emphasize the benefits of space technology to states
which had not yet fully utilized the new resources. The Second United
Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNIS-
PACE)10' was held at Vienna, Austria, in August of 1982. Ninety-three
nations attended.
UNISPACE was held not just for the benefit of U.N. members and
international organizations. Both governmental and non-governmental
entities participated, as did many corporations which had space related
products to market. A number of individuals, many of whom were leaders
in space development, also participated. Certain sessions were even open
to the public.
Among its accomplishments, the UNISPACE Conference developed
criteria for regulating the use of various space technologies, including sat-
ellite communications. In the opinion of the delegates, countries should
make choices based on the following factors:
1. the needs of the country;
2. that country's priorities;
3. the feasibility of meeting these needs and priorities through the
use of space technology, giving due regard to the needs of other
countries;
4. the country's financial resources, industrial infrastructure, and
technological capabilities;
5. the availability of human, scientific, engineering, and manage-
ment resources required for effective utilization of space technologies;
and,
6. the recognition of the rights of other countries to use space tech-
nologies at a later date.'
The Conference specifically recognized the GSO as a limited natural
resource of unique value for a multitude of space uses, with satellite com-
munications being but one of these uses. It called for this resource to be
103 Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UNISPACE), Draft Report of the Conference, AIConf. 101/10, at 6 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UNISPACE].
I Id. at 47.
105 Id.
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utilized in the most efficient manner possible. In this regard, the Confer-
ence took note that the ITU had formulated plans for the GSO and that
the 1985 and 1988 ITU Conferences are scheduled to develop still further
plans based on Resolution 3 of the 1979 WARC.0's
In particular, the "explosive growth in the use of GSO, especially for
communication satellites," 10 7 was seen as an indication that space tech-
nology is being utilized productively.
However, while GSO is occupied largely by developed countries'
satellites and international systems, 08 there are countries which have not
yet placed satellites in GSO; and increasing concerns have been ex-
pressed that these positions may not be available when they desire to use
them, and that assignments in certain frequency bands (e.g. 4 or 6 GHz)
may become more difficult to obtain in the future due to congestion.10
Thus, UNISPACE acknowledged these countries' concerns, observing
that controls are being developed. It summed up its philosophy on the
issue by saying, "[u]nnecessary congestion in GSO should be avoided tak-
ing into consideration the equal rights of all countries to GSO which is
one of the most important international resources"110
Delegates examined the economic feasibility of alternate satellite
communications systems, utilizing cost sharing and cooperation."1 Al-
though increasingly comprehensive and complex communications satel-
lites are being planned and deployed by the developing nations, 2 the
launching, operation, and maintenance of such heavy and complex de-
vices is too costly for most states to undertake alone. UNISPACE noted
the opportunity for increased international sharing of ground stations and
satellites." 3
Addressing the concern which some countries expressed about the
crowding of the GSO,1"4 UNISPACE noted that new technology is devel-
oping which will permit the distance between devices in GSO to be re-
duced. Paradoxically, however, more powerful and sophisticated satellites
10. Id. at 69.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 78.
109 Id. at 69-70.
110 Id. at 17.
" Id. at 16. For example, alternative systems could include use of large, high-powered
spacecraft which would be fixed on-station in the GSO, making possible a technology inver-
sion by which the complexity is shifted from the ground to the spacecraft. Id. The effect
would be to have small antennae ground stations with large antennae communications
satellites.
1'2Note, however, India's disappointing experience when a satellite became overloaded
with technology and failed.
113 UNISPACE, supra note 103, at 22.
114 Id. at 16.
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permit simpler ground stations, and the simpler ground stations require
satellites to be spaced more widely in the GSO. 115 Thus, this alternative
may create more problems. For example, the reduced costs of ground sta-
tions permit more people to receive DBS signals, creating a larger de-
mand for such service and thereby greatly exacerbating the debate be-
tween countries diametrically opposed on the sovereignty/free flow
issue.1"'
As an alternative, concentration of technology in large "space tele-
phone exchanges" in GSO orbit has been proposed and is now feasible.1"
Such large platforms would receive, process and transmit signals via nar-
row beams using large antennas. Such exchanges could result in more effi-
cient use of the GSO. However, UNISPACE expressed apprehension that
single states might establish such platforms for themselves to the exclu-
sion of, and in interference with, the needs of other less developed
states.11 8 UNISPACE encouraged a feasible alternative to such large plat-
forms-the placement of satellites in clusters which are inter-connected
electronically.'"
UNISPACE expressed a need for an improved system of registration
and coordination. All countries, it said, must be guaranteed "equitable
access" to GSO and to the frequency bands assigned for space communi-
cation services.1 20 The 1979 WARC resolved that prior registration of fre-
quency assignments with the IFRB would not establish a permanent pri-
ority of positions and frequencies.1 21 UNISPACE stated that such prior
registration and use should not become barriers to the initiation of sys-
tems in space by other countries.1
22
Turning to the 1976 Bogota Declaration, UNISPACE declared its po-
sition that the GSO is subject to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967123 and is
therefore free for the use of all states.1 24 In support of this, UNISPACE
pointed to the ITU Convention, under which the radio frequency spec-
trum and the GSO must be used to provide equitable access in accor-
dance with each countries' needs and available technology.
25
In response to the "unnecessary" objects in the GSO, and the result-
ing danger to satellites legitimately in the orbit, UNISPACE recom-
115 Id.
116 The cost has declined from $64,000 in 1965 to $9360 in 1981.






123 Id. at 70
124 Id.
125 Id. at 70-71.
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mended that owners of satellites be required to remove useless devices
from the GSO, and that countries review constantly whether they actually
need their satellites in GSO. UNISPACE called on the ITU to develop
criteria for this purpose, as well as to promote efficient use of the GSO
and the radio frequency spectrum." 6
Finally, UNISPACE made a number of recommendations for the de-
velopment and efficient use of the resources of outer space, including the
GSO. It encouraged states to:
1. establish regional systems for self-regulation;
2. share data;
3. coordinate systems in order to avoid interference;
4. coordinate programs;
5. undertake joint planning;
6. provide opportunities and facilities for developing countries to
utilize outer space;
7. provide education;
8. assist in establishing a space infrastructure; and,
9. develop space law regarding the technology of space and the
peaceful application of such technology.127
UNISPACE expressed the hope that "a leading role in the promotion
of more efficient use will no doubt be taken by countries with advanced
space technology."' 2 However, while concluding that "[t]he improve-
ments in the utilization of GSO that would arise from the use of new
technologies should permit all countries to have access to space technol-
ogy at a level of sophistication appropriate to their needs and require-
ments,"'1 29 it asked that any planning should also consider the future
needs of developing countries. Developing countries should not be forced
into imprudent investments merely to secure their stake in the GSO or
radio frequency spectrum.
c. UNESCO
On a somewhat broader scale, the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has dealt with GSO com-
munications from the perspective of an information resources policy,
founded largely on the conflict-avoidance justification."' UNESCO, how-
ever, suffers from an overly vague mandate to respect both the sover-
126 Id.
127 Id. at 87.
128 Id. at 70.
129 Id.
130 Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free
Flow of Information, Records of the General Conference, UNESCO 17th Sess., vol. 1, U.N.
Doc. 17 C/ Res. 4.111 (1972), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/109 (1973).
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eignty of states and the right of individuals to communicate.13 1 Moreover,
other more technology-specific regulations are the focus of discussions at
fora concerned with transnational data flow, such as the United Nations
Committee on Multinational Corporations, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, and the International Bureau of
Information, and thus preempt UNESCO discussions.
d. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty applies to outer space as well as celes-
tial bodies. Article I of the Treaty states:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial .bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the in-
terests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scien-
tific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any
kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, and states shall facilitate
and encourage international cooperation in such investigation. 132
Placing an object in the GSO would clearly constitute a "use of outer
space" and thus would be governed by article I.
The first clause of article I has not been interpreted to mean that all
nations must receive specific benefits from each satellite in space, either
monetarily or in services. Rather, it has been read to state only that space
activities, and thus by implication geostationary satellites, must benefit
all countries in a general sense.'33 The interpretation of the second clause
is intended to prevent monopolization of space by one nation or a group
of nations and to ensure that each state has an equal right to use outer
space.13 4
In 1966, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur
Goldberg, said that article I was intended to make clear that "outer space
and celestial bodies are open not just to the big powers or the first arriv-
als but shall be available to all, both now and in the future."' 3 5 Other
131 Id.
"I Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20.
133 Gorove, Freedom of Exploration and Use in the Outer Space Treaty, 1 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 93, 104 (1971).
13, Gibbons, Orbital Saturation: The Necessity for International Regulation of the Ge-
osynchronous Orbit, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 148 (1979).
135 Statement of Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg before General Assembly Committee I
(Political and Security), Dec. 17, 1966.
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commentators have gone further, arguing that since article I was included
in the body of the treaty and not in the preamble, it was the intent of the
drafters that the "common interest" clause be a treaty obligation and not
simply a general goal. 36
A dispute has arisen over the meaning of article II as applied to the
GSO. Article II states that "[o]uter space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sover-
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."' 13 The
United States has interpreted this to mean that as long as a use of the
GSO is a legitimate use under the Treaty there is no appropriation.138
The French have stated that the use of geostationary satellites can be
regarded as an appropriation by occupation.3 9
The Treaty applies to parties if they are acting alone, with another
state or states or in an international organization. 40 This provision can be
interpreted to mean that the Treaty applies to any international organi-
zation of which a member state is a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty
and that that organization's violations are imputed to be member states'
violations. Individual states are, therefore, responsible to see that the in-
ternational organizations to which they belong abide by the Treaty.
A major point of controversy in the application of the Treaty is to
what physical space it can be applied. In 1976, a group of equatorial
countries claimed sovereignty over the GSO. Part of the basis of their
claim was a creative argument that the GSO was gravitationally unique
from other possible orbits for satellites; hence, it was technically not part
of outer space, and thus was not immune to sovereignty claims under the
Outer Space Treaty.' 4 ' Because the Outer Space Treaty contains no defi-
nition of outer space nor any formula to determine where outer space
begins and airspace ends, customary international law is the only source
for defining the applicable boundaries of the Treaty.14 2 This customary
law is itself based on, among other things, the widely accepted practices
among and between nations. Herein lies a problem, however, since the
only countries capable of establishing these practices are those who are
able to venture into space. Thus, the actions of a few technologically ad-
vanced nations are establishing the norms and customs for the entire in-
"' Markoff, International Space Agency Project, The Bogota Declaration, and the
Common Interests Rule, PROC. OF THE TWENTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
34 (1978).
137 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20.
138 Rankin, Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit-A Need for Orbital Allocation?, 13
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 98, 100 (1974); Gibbons, supra note 134.
139 Rankin, supra note 138.
110 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. XIII.
4 Bogota Declaration, supra note 9.
142 I.C.J. CHARTER art. 38.
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ternational community and by implication the application of the Outer
Space Treaty.143 Such a definition will surely be made in the best inter-
ests of the spacepowers (who stand to lose much in terms of economic,
political and military powers) and therefore may overly limit other states'
access to the GSO.
3. Regional Accords
Regional approaches to satellite broadcasting have proliferated. 144
They represent the confluence of naturally similar interests, and they not
only provide a more manageable regulatory system in terms of size, but
also permit "experiments" in the use of novel regulatory concepts.
ARABSAT and the recent Council of Europe Declaration on the Freedom
of Expression and Information represent two such attempts. 145 In these
regimes, the basis for regulation is conflict minimalization, combined with
the added similarity of interest that members of these consortia may be
presumed to have.
One of the major contributions of these systems could be the even-
tual development, through conciliation and negotiation on an ad hoc ba-
sis, of some "common law" of broadcasting from GSO. e46 A framework for
this type of regulation could be a mix of international standards with the
concerns expressed in national systems. Essentially, a dynamic model of
broadcast law would have the capacity to recognize the de facto lack of
agreement over substantive regulation, yet nonetheless acknowledge that
the international implications of the use of GSO requires accepted meth-
ods of dispute resolution. This approach may spur the continuing devel-
opment of space technology in ways that the adoption of international
standards alone would not.
4. Dispute Resolution
In highly technical and rapidly advancing fields, such as the develop-
ment of outer space, and particularly the use of the GSO for communica-
tions purposes, mechanisms specifically designed to resolve disputes con-
cerning these matters offer advantages over more general ones.
Traditional methods used to resolve international conflicts have included
negotiation, "good offices," mediation, conciliation, inquiry, arbitration
14 Gibbons, supra note 134.
144 Price, supra note 45, at 82.
14 Europeans tackle DBS issues, supra note 45, at 251. Each is a potential dispute
resolution body. Such bodies and their procedural systems are dealt with more extensively
below.
.. Price, supra note 45, at 82.
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and judicial settlement. 14 7
a. Current Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Existing in Treaties Con-
cerning Outer Space and Communications
Projection of some potential conflicts arising from the use of outer
space is currently possible. For the purpose of this article, these disputes
are separated into two broad categories.
Technical Conflicts are those which permit the involved parties to
preserve their sovereign existence in a relatively undisturbed fashion.
Controversies over money damages, for example, fall into this category.
So do differing interpretations of mere technical rules found in interna-
tional agreements. Sovereign Conflicts directly involve indicia of a na-
tion's sovereignty, for example, control of or jurisdiction over places and
things. Thus, the claim by one country that it has the right to prohibit
signals from direct broadcast satellites of a second state from being trans-
mitted into its territory can evolve into a conflict of this type. 4"
147 Negotiation takes the form of direct discussion between the disputing parties with-
out third-party intervention. Implicitly, both parties seek through negotiation to voluntarily
resolve the dispute. i
Good offices can best be described as the friendly intervention by a third party whose
designated function it is to bring the parties to a dispute together. If properly executed, this
method requires the least amount of outside pressure in resolving the conflict.
Mediation can be differentiated from "good offices" in that the third party takes an
active part in the discussion so as to act as a catalyst to dispute resolution.
An international institution may undertake conciliation, when it wishes a friendly set-
tlement to occur, but without imposing any particular solution on the parties.
Inquiry is sometimes undertaken by an international institution in order to elicit facts
and occasionally legal conclusions stemming from a conflict, thereby providing the parties
with a seemingly independent and detached basis on which to resolve the dispute.
Judicial surroundings characterize the arbitration method of conflict resolution. States
or disputing parties plead their case to judges of their own choice and, on the basis of re-
spect for law and a voluntary acknowledgment of an incumbent duty to accept and carry out
the award in good faith, accept the decision handed down.
Finally, the most structured and adversarial method is judicial settlement. Although
the case is pleaded in much the same manner as in the arbitration setting, the tribunal is a
pre-existing one, with a standing bench of judges, and as such is more detached from the
controversy. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (5th ed. 1967).
148 States may not be the only parties to disputes over outer space. Corporate entitites,
international institutions, and individuals may become involved as primary parties. See
Dula, Regulations of Private Commercial Space Activities, 23 JURIMETMcs 156 (1983).
In the Convention of International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter cited as Damages Convention],
article VIII provides that a claim for damages incurred by an individual shall be brought by
a state representing that individual. This state may either be the one where the damage
occurred, the state of nationality, or the state in which the individual is a permanent resi-




Two treaties and two draft treaties concerning outer space issues cur-
rently exist. The two treaties in force utilize arbitration. However, the
disputes they address fall only into the technical category. The two draft
treaties encompass subjects which may potentially give rise to sovereign
conflicts. The two draft treaties do not use arbitration as a resolution
method.
i. The Technical Conflicts
The Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by
Space Objects (Damages Convention) provides a two-step process
whereby claims for monetary damages can be resolved.149 Articles IX and
XIV suggest that settlement of a claim should be made through "diplo-
matic negotiations." If, however, settlement cannot be achieved through
this method, articles XIV through XX provide for the establishment of a
Claims Commission to conduct arbitration.
During the drafting of this treaty, disagreements arose over what
power the Claims Commission should have in order to impose its decision
upon parties.150 A compromise was agreed upon 15 and the decision of the
Commission is to be "final and binding if the parties have so agreed;
otherwise, the Commission shall render a final and recommendatory
award, which the parties shall consider in good faith.'' 52 The language
used was carefully drafted so as to be ambiguous,153 thus preserving the
legality of dissenting action by a sovereign nation in the face of an ad-
verse award by the Commission. Use of such language avoids de facto
relinquishment of any freedom of choice by a state through its becoming
a signatory of the Convention. Thus, in conflicts over the question of
monetary damages, "technical conflicts," the Damages Convention was
unable to establish a binding mechanism for dispute resolution.
The second pertinent treaty is the International telecommunications
Convention (ITC).'" Article 50 of the ITC provides for the resolution of
"disputes or questions of interpretation or applications of provisions" of
the Convention. This is to be done through "diplomatic channels," or
other mechanisms "mutually agreed upon." However, should the parties
not adopt these mechanisms, "any member party may submit the dispute
For the purposes of this paper, only controversies between states will be discussed.
149 Damages Convention, supra note 148, 24 U.S.T. at 2395-2400.
150 See 1 N. JASENTULIYANA & R. LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAw 90 (1979).
251 Id. at 137-42.
"' Damages Convention, supra note 148, 24 U.S.T. at 2400 (art. XIX(2)) (emphasis
added).
253 1 N. JASENTULIYANA & R. LEE, supra note 150, at 140.
25 I.T.C., supra note 18.
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to arbitration." 15 5 Article 81 declares that the decision of the arbitrator
(or arbitration panel) should be "final and binding." 56
This language seems to explicitly provide a mechanism which is
binding upon member states in disputes affecting sovereignty. In practice,
however, this arbitration procedure is used solely for resolution of dis-
putes involving the technical rules. Political questions are, in practice, ei-
ther left to negotiations between the parties themselves or to be ad-
dressed at meetings of the ITU. A prime example of this is the current
dispute between RCA and the Cuban government. It seems that RCA's
SATCOM IV may soon not be alone at 830 west latitude in the GSO. The
Cuban government is currently planning to send a satellite to essentially
the same position, using the same transmission frequencies.1 57 Such a
placement, according to RCA, would cause such co-channel interference
that SATCOM would be rendered almost useless. RCA contacted the
State Department and asked that it persuade the Cubans not to launch
their satellite. It is anticipated that the countries' governments will ad-
dress the problem diplomatically rather than one of them submitting the
question to arbitration or using other international conflict resolution
methods.
ii. Sovereign Conflicts
The Principles Governing Direct Satellite Broadcasting,58 and the
Principle Relating to Remote Sensing of Earth, 59 are draft treaties whose
subject areas encompass sovereignty issues. Both contain clauses address-
ing conflict resolution which are similar. They provide that any dispute
arising through the application of the respective treaties should be re-
solved via consultation between the parties. Failing this, resolution is to
be sought through other "established procedures." 60 No arbitration pro-
visions are included.
Thus, in none of the four treaties concerning outer space has arbitra-
tion been utilized as a method to resolve Sovereign conflicts. As demon-
strated in the Damages Convention, binding arbitration is in fact only
1 Id. at art. 50.
" Id. at art. 81.
257 Monday Morning Memo, Oct. 3, 1983, at 3 (publication of National Radio Broad-
casters Association).
I U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/218, Annex II (1978); 1 N. JAsEULiYANA & R. LEE, supra note
150, at 105. In a modified form, this draft treaty was adopted as a United Nations General
Assembly Resolution. See 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 102.
9 U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/218, supra note 158, at Annex M; 1 N. JASENTULTYANA & R.
LEE, supra note 150, at 111.
180 U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/218, supra note 158, at Annex I.
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reluctantly resorted to even in the technical conflicts. 1"
b. Judicial Tribunals
The most traditional form of dispute resolution is the judicial tribu-
nal. Although not referred to in any treaty or draft treaty concerning
outer space, a discussion of this method is nonetheless provided because
of its traditional importance. Two basic types of judicial tribunals exist,
those which are national and those which are international.
With national tribunals, distinct difficulties arise for the interna-
tional party. One is essentially procedural, involving questions such as ju-
risdiction and sovereignty. The outcome of these can be problematic in
any politically sensitive case. Another difficulty centers about the sub-
stantive law to be applied. In some conflicts, merely the choice of forum,
by itself, may be completely determinative of the litigation. As an exam-
ple, this would be true for many issues concerning information flow. Such
difficulties make national tribunals inappropriate for most international
issues arising over the uses of outer space.
The second type of tribunal is the international one, best represented
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Its statutes specify that it
shall have jurisdiction only over those cases which are referred to it by
the parties or where jurisdiction is specifically provided for in a treaty or
other convention. 16 2 Thus, an act of political will on the part of a party-
state is required to submit a case to the ICJ. Moreover, while one party
may submit to the ICJ, the opposing party may choose not to recognize
its competence in the particular case. 63 For these reasons, international
judicial tribunals, like their national counterparts, are of questionable use
in the resolution of disputes concerning outer space.
c. Suggestions for the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes Concerning Outer
Space
From the foregoing analysis it may be gleaned that resolution of
technical and other isolated issues could be accomplished through
mandatory arbitration between states. However, broader issues affecting
national sovereignty must be resolved by the parties themselves through
the use of other mechanisms. Fortunately, because space activities have
the ability to affect many countries on earth simultaneously, and imple-
mentation of complex technologies in outer space can impact on the sov-
ereignty of nations as few other developments have in man's history, it is
101 Damages Convention, supra note 148 and accompanying text.
162 I.C.J. CHARTER arts. 36, 37.
163 See generally S. ROSENE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 91
(1965).
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in the interest of all states to resolve space conflicts. Therefore, alternate
mechanisms of dispute resolution, as opposed to arbitration or judicial
settlement, seem appropriate. Specifically, two traditional mechanisms,
inquiry and conciliation, appear to be satisfactory alternatives given the
existing conditions which limit the effectiveness of dispute settlement
mechanisms.
Inquiry seems particularly appropriate because it is a fact-eliciting
procedure. Space activity will be highly technical, thus fact determination
should prove apt at defining issues and highlighting possible solutions.
Conciliation calls for a neutral, third party to actively mediate a dispute.
This third party can inject possible solutions into the resolution process,
while avoiding many of the loss-of-face difficulties present in face-to-face
negotiations. Additionally, it enables the neutral party to exert subtle
pressure on the disputing parties in a context where such pressure may be
accepted. Thus conciliation can offer many of arbitration's advantages in
a situation where arbitration is otherwise inappropriate.
Legal, extra-national entities might be created in order to provide the
neutral fora which are necessary for inquiry and conciliation.1  Arbitra-
tion and judicial settlement, although by no means abandoned, should
realistically be relegated for use only in technical conflicts.
It is hoped that the institutions proposed here can be established
prior to the outbreak of any substantial international space conflict.
Should they be successful in resolving initial disputes, they may acquire
the precedential value needed to become the primary resort when future
conflicts over outer space occur. As the development of the GSO is pro-
ceeding rapidly, inclusion of these mechanisms in future international
agreements concerning the GSO would be a suitable testing ground for
this proposal.
V. FUTURE PROJECTIONS AND THE SPACE-WARC
As the exploration of outer space has progressed, use of the GSO re-
source has been allocated on an essentially first-come, first-serve basis." 5
14 Precedent exists for the use of conciliation in the U.N. Code of Conduct for Lines
Conferences. "[T]he Code provides for settlement of disputes by one or more conciliators
chosen from an international panel of conciliators ... by the disputants to hear and settle
their controversy." Larsen & Vetternick, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Lines Confer-
ences: Reservations, Reactions and U.S. Alternatives, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 223, 241
(1981). The panel is to consist of "experts of high repute or experience in the field of law,
economics of sea transport, or foreign trade and finance, as determined by the Contracting
parties selecting them." 2 UNCTAD United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a
Code of Conduct for Lines Conferences, art. 30(1), U.N. Doc. TD/Code/Add. 1 (1975).




Those first to place satellites in orbit have gained priority rights over
late-comers merely by their physical presence in the orbital slot, and it is
already apparent that the most advantageous orbits are steadily becoming
filled.1 68 Because the technology involved is rapidly changing, what is not
now clear is how many satellites can co-exist in GSO without interfering
with each other.16 7 Although short-falls in available space may be averted
for many years by new technologies, the uncertainty of this problem has
brought political uneasiness, as evidenced by the the Bogota
Declaration.6 8
It cannot be assumed that claims by developing nations will disap-
pear, nor that technological advances will forever keep abreast of the de-
mand for orbital slots. Developing nations are heavily concerned with
their own economic development and independence. Like all nations, they
recognize the importance of communications in today's world.
The danger now faced is that actions of the developed nations, which
ignore LDC demands without suggesting reasonable alternatives, will be
interpreted as insensitivity to poorer nations and insincerity about princi-
ples of equity. 6 ' This may lead to a lack of respect for the rights of pre-
sent users. Such a set of circumstances would breed conflict and may lead
to chaos in communications. Although this conflict has not ripened, cur-
rent U.S. policy determinations are a foreshadowing of possible conflict.
On one hand, at the 1983 ITU Regional Conference the United States
accepted as satisfactory in principle the plan for use of the geostationary
orbit for direct broadcast satellites. Furthermore, the United States has
agreed to participate in SPACE-WARC, which has as its mandate to
guarantee equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit and to the
frequency bands. On the other hand, the United States has indicated it
will only participate if alternative solutions to a priori planning are also
considered. As indicated in the FCC Notice of Inquiry1 70 the United
States is opposed to further a priori allocation of geostationary orbital
slots and frequencies, and has apparently based preparations for the con-
ference on this principle. However, foreign countries and particularly de-
1" As stated, infra, one estimate suggests 239 active geostationary satellites will be in
orbit by the year 1990. Id. at 446. This would certainly be a large number, leaving an aver-
age of less than 20 between each satellite.
,67 The distance required between satellites will depend on the function of each satel-
lte and the radio frequencies available for use. The satellites are physically quite a distance
apart even at 10 spacing, roughly 450 miles per degree [Distance = circumference/360 =
3.14159 x 2 x (22,300 + 3,500)/360 = 450.29 miles per degree].
168 See supra Section I.
169 "The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries," and "shall be free for exploration and use for all states with-
out discrimination of any kind." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. L
170 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 7, at 4.
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veloping countries in various United Nations fora have expressed strong
demands for orderly sharing of the GSO resource. It is important that
alternatives be considered to avoid such a scenario and hopefully to pro-
duce a system as equitable and efficient as possible. 7 1
A seed presently exists for the resolution of conflicting claims to
GSO. That seed is in the already discussed Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
In article I it is agreed that the use of outer space shall be free and that
its use shall be based on equality.172 Furthermore, article II stipulates
that outer space is not subject to appropriation by means of use, by
claims of sovereignty or by any other means. 7 3 From these beginnings it
seems possible to agree on the following:
1. The use of the GSO must be efficient. This requires that users
must be informed about efficient utilization of the GSO, they must be
willing to coordinate their activities with other states, and they must re-
frain from wasteful practices.
2. The concerns of the developing countries must be taken into ac-
count. This is true whether or not these concerns have a basis in reality,
since the political basis which they do have can result in a considerable
increase in North-South tension. Thus, the developing countries' con-
cerns over the possible preemption from future use of the GSO must be
resolved, and they must be resolved in an equitable manner.
3. The military use of the GSO must be recognized as a fact and
must be accounted for in international agreements.
4. Continued development and implementation of communications
technology on a world-wide scale must be encouraged. This includes de-
velopment of alternate ground based systems, such as integrated services
digital networks utilizing fiber optic cables, and complex satellites pos-
sessing vastly increased capabilities.
5. International agreements resolving many of the present conflicts
concerning satellite communications, such as the free flow of information
question, should be reached speedily, particularly prior to the advent of
international DBS services.
6. Mechanisms for international dispute resolution should be de-
vised and institutionalized prior to the outbreak of political disputes in
outer space. These conflict resolution mechanisms should include stand-
ing fora for inquiry and conciliation.
The widespread acceptance of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty by the inter-
national community demonstrates that the political will to peacefully reg-
ulate the use of outer space does exist. Progress made in COPUOS, the
ITU and at recent WARC meetings shows that this is particularly the
1 Of course, equity and efficiency may be diametrically opposed in some instances,
and there is no easy definition of equity in international relations.
12 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. I.
173 Id. at art. II.
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case with respect to the GSO, substantial difficulties notwithstanding.
However, the particular fears of the LDC's, combined with a growing ap-
pearance that military use of the GSO by the space powers will work
against the interests of the majority of the world's peoples,174 calls for an
immediate and imaginative response.
In attempting to regulate the use of the GSO equitably and effi-
ciently, the international community can look to the work already under-
taken to develop an agreement for the regulation of DBS. If nations could
come to terms with the difficult issues inherent in DBS, one of the imped-
iments to allocation and regulation of orbital slots would easily and logi-
cally be resolved.
The major difficulty in obtaining an acceptable international agree-
ment on DBS is the question of broadcasts into national territories by
other nations. Currently, almost all nations exercise some degree of con-
trol over material broadcast within their borders, and it is unrealistic to
expect states to forego at least some degree of control over material
broadcast via DBS. Negotiations beyond the 1982 UNGA Resolution on
DBS should be pursued to find an acceptable compromise agreement be-
tween the competing principles of state sovereignty and free flow of infor-
mation. The alternative can only be increased tension between all
states.
17 5
Additionally, other international conventions can contribute to the
peaceful use of space technology. In 1978, France proposed a global satel-
lite monitoring agency which would enable the United Nations to ascer-
tain facts and communicate rapidly and reliably in times of crisis.176
Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. supported this idea,17 but a
compelling argument can be made that the cooperative use of satellite
communications technology is crucial in the nuclear age.
Finally, Recommendation 12 of the 1979 WARC called for a "World
Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of Geostationary-Satellite
Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It."' 78 The 1982 Pleni-
potentiary Conference in Nairobi decided to convene the first session of
this Conference, known as SPACE-WARC, on August 8, 1985, in Ge-
1' Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1982, at 18, col. 1.
175 Cooperation or Confrontation in Outer Space, THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE ON THE
U.N. OF THE NE T DECADE 26 (1978).
178 See Lay, Space Law: A New Proposal, 8 J. SPACE L. 41, 48 (1980).
' This idea surfaced again in 1980, in the U.N. Committee on Disarmament. See J.
JOYCE, THE WAR MACHINE: THE CASE AGAINST THE ARMs RACE 201 (1980).
17 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva, 1979, rec. 12,
reprinted in NAT'L TECH. INFO. SERVICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, II FINAL ACTS OF THE WORLD
ADmNISTRATIvE RADIO CONFERENCE (1979); see also U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note
79.
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neva. 17 9 An agenda for the SPACE-WARC was adopted at the May 1983
meeting of the ITU Administrative Council which recognized that Reso-
lution 3 of WARC '79 required the Council "to convene a world space
administrative radio conference with the essential objective to guarantee
in practice, for all countries, equitable access to the geostationary satellite
orbit and to the frequency bands allocated to the space services utilizing
it" and that this conference be held in two sessions. 80 SPACE-WARC
will consider and establish planning principles concerning the needs of
particular countries for the use of the GSO and will establish regulatory
guidelines for such use,'8 ' while at the same time recognizing that the
changing need for services and technological gains will require a certain
amount of flexibility in SPACE-WARC planning.
The impetus for the SPACE-WARC is the increasing use of the GSO.
Countries wishing to use GSO satellite positions in certain areas (bands)
have experienced difficulty in coordinating such new positions with coun-
tries which have previously placed satellites in nearby orbits. At WARC
'79, some countries argued that the existing allocation system (based on
coordination) was inadequate and inequitable and should be revised. De-
veloping countries were particularly vociferous in advocating new regula-
tions which would result in more efficient use of the GSO. To answer
these concerns, the Council decided that the SPACE-WARC conference
should first of all "review the situation prevailing in the bands allocated
to space services on the basis of: information communicated by adminis-
trations [and] a report to be prepared by the IFRB in accordance with
Resolution No. 3 of WARC-79.''8 2 The agenda for SPACE-WARC states
that it shall "decide on the basis of proposals received from administra-
tions, which space services and frequency bands should be planned."183
While each conference is sovereign, the SPACE-WARC conference has
indeed been given the task to engage in a priori planning of space ser-
vices and frequency bands.
The United States has generally been content with the existing sys-
tem, and it was therefore not among the countries advocating establish-
ment of new regulations.' 8 The United States fears that the current sys-
tem for accomodation of satellite positions through ITU coordination
may be replaced by an inflexible system. 85 However, the U.S. delegation
to the 1979 WARC stated that, in a spirit of compromise, it could accept
179 Res. No. 895, reprinted in Notice of Inquiry, supra note 7, at app. B2. The second
sessions of SPACE-WARC is scheduled for 1988. Id. at 3.








the recommendation to hold the SPACE-WARC, keeping in mind how-
ever the need for flexibility.18
To plan effectively for the Conference, the United States must ther-
efore first evaluate the prevailing situation regarding the use of communi-
cations satellites in geostationary orbit; that is, whether the U.S. use of
the geostationary orbit and its allocation of frequency bands is best
served by the current and prevailing system of usage, or whether other
systems are preferable. The FCC has decided that its study of the pre-
vailing situation will include "all relevant information associated with the
development and use of communication satellites in GSO, including an-
ticipated consequences of current activities and programs. 18 7 The FCC
analysis of the prevailing situation will consider at least the following six
factors: (1) implementation of communication satellites, (2) demand of
users for services, (3) developments in technology, (4) the networks which
have evolved in telecommunications, (5) the internal institutions and (6)
ITU's efficiency in coordinating use.188
First, in regards to the implementation of communication satellites,
the FCC is confident that its policy of minimum government regulation is
preferable. Despite contrary views189 the FCC, until recently, was of the
view that "the notion that most of the GSO is likely to become 'crowded'
is a very unfortunate but widespread misperception with little basis in
fact."190
Second, for realistic SPACE-WARC assessment it is critical that the
user demand for services be established. Such demand is presently con-
centrated in a few countries, such as the United States, Western Europe
and the U.S.S.R., and the FCC is of the view that the developing coun-
tries' demands for use of GSO will be increased only at "a moderate
rate."19' A study of the prevailing situation must ascertain credible pro-
jections of demand for services by users. Otherwise, without realistic as-
sessment of user demand, the SPACE-WARC could by mistake assign
slots and frequencies for uses which will never happen and thus waste
this valuable resource.192 The FCC encourages the ITU to consider "de-
mand forecast models as analytical tools."'' 93
The third factor, the expanding technology, is important not only in
providing low-cost service but also in making this kind of service availa-
ble to more people. In fact, the technology is expanding so rapidly that it
286 Id.
287 Id. at 6.
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19 Id. at 7.
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is difficult to make accurate predictions as to what technology will be
available in the future. The FCC has decided that any kind of technical
restraints have an inhibiting effect and should be avoided as a matter of
policy.194 The FCC is "very concerned whether an international agree-
ment might be effected which is potentially obligatory as a treaty instru-
ment that could significantly complicate this matter and frustrate our do-
mestic deregulatory goals, particularly in a field as rapidly evolving as
satellite communication."1 95 It concludes that "any international arrange-
ments to which the United States is a party must not unduly hinder us
from achieving our own national goals."'9' In addition, the FCC is of the
view that a competitive environment is most favorable to development of
technology and that the cost of new technology will be driven downwards
by a pro-competitive environment. Ultimately the benefits of these devel-
opments in technology will become available to all countries which bene-
fit from the freedom of technology to develop.' 97
In considering the fourth factor, networks which have evolved in tele-
communications, the FCC points to the beneficial U.S. experience of GSO
use by multiple private enterprises. In spite of the history in other coun-
tries of state monopolies in telecommunications networks, the FCC be-
lieves that the SPACE-WARC should consider that although other coun-
tries do not now follow the U.S. private enterprise approach "their
domestic telecommunication networks and associated infrastructure will
nonetheless undergo significant changes during the next two decades that
cannot begin to be totally envisioned at this time."'9 " Furthermore, the
FCC expects the U.S. free enterprise networks to develop and expand
rapidly "as to architecture, ownership and technology."19
Fifth, the FCC is of the view that developing countries will attach
increasing importance to international institutions such as INTELSAT
and INMARSAT to provide not only international services but also re-
sources in order to obtain the advantages of new technology. This obser-
vation is motivated by the established need to pool domestic resources.
Thus the FCC believes that it will be contrary to developing countries'
interests to insist too rigidly on a priori assignments of the GSO because
they will need flexibility for these institutions to develop. 00
The sixth and final factor is the ITU's efficiency in coordinating GSO
use. The United States believes the existing ITU system of advance pub-
14 Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, F.C.C. 83-67 (Mar. 18, 1983).
195 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 7, at 9.
199 Id.
197 Id.





lication of projected uses, subsequent coordination with and notification
to other countries within ITU appear "to be satisfactory and cost effec-
tive. '20 1 The FCC Notice of Inquiry notes that this process "has allowed
the kind of continuing flexibility that has allowed constant technical and
operational adjustments to assure open entry. This is in many respects,
equitable access in practice. '20 2 Thus the FCC is of the view that "it
seems that detailed a priori plans applied to even the most amenable
communication satellite service have yet to demonstrate in practice their
usefulness in assuring equitable access. '20 3
The policy of the FCC is clear. It believes that "[a]ny detailed a pri-
ori assignment plans for communication satellite services beyond those
that already exist for the broadcasting-satellite service at 12 GHz and the
associated feeder-link bands appear unacceptable to the United
States."'20 ' Therefore, the FCC wants the SPACE-WARC conference to
accept as a basic premise that "a wide range of planning options" must be
considered. Otherwise, "there is no point in any further dialogue" because
the FCC essentially believes that no further a priori plans are required or
necessary. Essentially the FCC is of the view that the existing ITU sys-
tem of coordination use is satisfactory.20 5 Private U.S. industry interests
support this view, 206 which is understandable because these interests are
the primary beneficiaries of the FCC's policy.
Furthermore, the FCC Notice of Inquiry notes that ITU's activity in
this area must be guided by ITU's basic objective which is solely "to
avoid harmful interference. '20 7 Therefore, the FCC does not appear inter-
ested in any planned division of GSO resources merely because they may
become scarce in the future. The FCC concludes:
It seems patent that a detailed a priori assignment plan contained in a
treaty instrument for any communication satellite service other than
broadcasting-satellite is not feasible, or to the extent feasible, not desira-
ble. This planning approach utilizes the most inflexible possible legal de-
vice, a multilateral treaty, accepts the demands for allotments without
any scrutiny or controls, explicitly or implicitly freezes dozens of techni-
cal and operational characteristics of every communication satellite facil-
ity at some low common denominator, impairs the ability to later share a
common facility, and suggests the conveyance of protection normally af-
forded an actual station.208
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Thus, the FCC is of the view that an a priori assignment plan would be
contrary to U.S. communication policy, 0 9 and that such a plan would also
impede international development of communications.2 10 It states that "it
is difficult to envision whose interests, whether developed or developing
country, would be served by the further application of a rigid a priori
assignment planning method" which would place constraints on techno-
logical development and would "defer the promise these facilities hold for
many kinds of innovative, low-cost, universal information services in the
future for all peoples.
21 1
Is this geostationary orbit a scarce resource? While the amount of
possible orbital slots will increase with improvements in technology, and
although visions of orbital congestion must be tempered by the very real
prospects of earth-based alternatives, in particular fiber optic cable, it is
the current availability of the GSO as a means of world-wide communica-
tions which preoccupies nations. Although it is possible that nations over-
emphasize the value of this resource, until the GSO's potential value and
limitations can be accurately assessed, and until alternative communica-
tions technology becomes a reality, countries will contine to envision the
GSO as a scarce world resource worth contesting for. The use of this re-
source must, therefore, be carefully coordinated among nations so that
the resource is used most efficiently, yet without depriving any one coun-
try of its equitable share. Because states have legitimate concerns over
the future use of this resource, an important potential conffict exists.
The United States, through the FCC's recent Notice of Inquiry, ex-
presses willingness to participate in good faith in the SPACE-WARC ne-
gotiations." 2 Those negotiations will include advance planning for the use
of the geostationary orbit's frequency bands and space services. Although
the FCC and the current administration have expressly rejected the con-
cept of a priori planning, the FCC has also expressed willingness to par-
ticipate in conference negotiations as long as all avenues will be explored.
Interestingly, the United States accepted at the 1983 ITU Regional
Administrative Radio Conference (RARC) a priori planning for the use of
the geostationary orbit by direct broadacast satellites (DBS).213 In those
negotiations the United States received sufficient orbital slots and fre-
quencies to satisfy its needs. The outcome of the RARC is important not
only because of its results, but also because of the breach with the past
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Unfortunately, the 1983 Notice of Inquiry fails to weigh the results of
the 1983 RARC in terms of its precedential value. There is an important
lesson to be learned from the 1983 RARC, because of its approach to con-
flict resolution brought an acceptable outcome for all countries involved.
The Administration's concerns seem to rest on the implicit assumption
that due to the scarcity of GSO slots in relation to DBS slots and fre-
quencies and relative demands therefor, that a priori planning in allocat-
ing the GSO will not result in an acceptable outcome for the United
States.
Although the United States is the most extensive user of the geosta-
tionary orbit, it has only one vote at international conferences such as the
SPACE-WARC. On the other side are the clearly expressed views of the
large majority of nations, notably at the 1982 UNISPACE Conference
and at other U.N. and ITU meetings, that they want some a priori plan-
ning for the use of the geostationary orbit. Their legal arguments are
based on article I of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which states outer
space "shall be free for exploration and use by all states without discrimi-
nation of any kind on a basis of equality and in accordance with interna-
tional law, 2 14 and on article 33 of the ITU treaty which recognizes that
"radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited na-
tional resources, that must be used efficiently and economically so that
countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both...
according to their needs and technical facilities at their disposal. ' 215 Fur-
thermore, the ITU agreed in 1982 to meet the special needs of the devel-
oping countries in "guaranteeing equitable access to the geostationary or-
bit and to the frequency bands. '216 Thus, the United States appears to be
on a clear collision course over the use of the geostationary orbit.
With the exceptions of a few equatorial countries, it is generally ac-
cepted that the geostationary orbit is not a unilateral national resource,
but an international resource. Therein lies the problem facing the United
States. United States experience in allocating other international re-
sources, notably international air traffic rights, has been that it is not pos-
sible to extend U.S. deregulation policy beyond our borders, except by
agreement with other countries. Once those rights have been obtained by
negotiation, then it is possible to throw those rights open for use with or
without governmental allocation.
The advantage to such a planned approach to obtaining user rights
by negotiation is that the parties to the negotiations agree to respect each
other's use, and agree to abstain from harmful interference. If this pro-
cess is based on the real needs of bargaining countries, then the SPACE-
214 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. I.
215 I.T.C., supra note 18, at art. 33.
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WARC conference may indeed produce an allocation methodology accept-
able to all countries, even those heavy users of the GSO such as the
United States. However, there is little chance of success if one country
declines to enter into negotiations unless its position is accepted. In that
case, the likely result is increased conflict and harmful interference, thus
causing general deterioration of the GSO resource.
To meet this challenge, the United States must accept a degree of
negotiating flexibility so that by allowing other countries' needs to be met
those other countries will agree to meet the United States' heavy de-
mands on GSO use. In the absence of such dialogue and flexibility, how-
ever, these needs will not be met, and the countries of the world will con-
tinue on a collision course toward intolerable congestion due to continued
allocation on a first-come, first-served basis.
